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Summary
In his main monograph, Michael Polanyi promotes a new philosophy, the “fidu¬
ciary program,” which is meant to tackle problems facing humanity. At its core,
there is a new epistemology called Personal Knowledge, which is also the title of
the book. This includes a comprehensive description of tire epistemology of
engineering as a distinct mode of knowing with its own characteristics, along
with Polanyi’s other two categories, “natural” and “exact” sciences.
In this article, Polanyi’s engineering epistemology is reconstructed and
evaluated. Polanyi states that all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in the
tacit, and also explains how it originated from inarticulate animal knowledge.
The knowledge of engineers is rooted in evolution in what Polanyi calls Type A
learning, which involves a heuristic act of contrivance. For animals, this is
essential for discovering means-ends-relationships.
For human engineers, the situation is not at all different. They harbor a par¬
ticular kind of intellectual passion, the heuristic passion for discovering novel
and economic ways of achieving goals.
What they discover are certain kinds of rules of rightness: operational prin¬
ciples of machines. This concept is part of Polanyi’s hierarchical ontology.
According to Polanyi, our material world has multiple levels of existence.
Some things—living organizations and machines— are more real than every¬
thing else, because they are not merely material: they are emergent. In Po¬
lanyi’s view, there is nothing extraordinary about these entities, as they are
part of nature. As such, they should be accounted for by science just like any
other phenomena. And, in fact, science does this, but it does not reflect this
fact because it tends to employ a faulty methodology.
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Emergent entities come into existence— or emerge—from matter. This is pos¬sible because the laws of matter leave roomfor higher level laws—rules of right¬ness—to operate. In the context of machines, these higher-level laws are calledoperational principles. The correctly implemented machine can operate flaw¬lesslyas long as the material conditions do not deteriorate outside limits.
The knowledge of the engineer is about these rules of rightness. From this, itfollows that discovery in engineering means finding new operational princi¬ples. But the rules of rightness cannot account for faulty behavior. Failuresalways have material causes; therefore, the engineering profession entails agood grasp of material sciences. I will argue that this approach can be theconceptual basis for basic engineering research that is in contrast with ap¬plied science, the category engineering usually falls into.1
6.1 Introduction
This article extracts the aspects relevant for engineering epistemology fromMichael Polanyi’s main philosophical work. This monograph [175], titledPersonal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (PK from this point)offers a completely novel, all-encompassing epistemology and also bold onto¬logical statements. In this article, I don’t rely much on any other Polanyisources, except Life’s Irreducible Structure [174] and The Structure of Con¬sciousness [166]. Also, I refer to the work of Phil Mullins about Michael Polanyion Machines as Comprehensive Entities [139] in the same volume this articleappears an on Esther Meek’s ContactWith Reality [120], The main reason forthis is that there appears to be no major shifts in his thinking about the issuesrelevant to us - his subsequent works all tend to the same direction as set outin PK only in more detail and an altered terminology.
Polanyi aims to update the core of what we think about the nature and statusof all knowledge in general. As the nature of knowing is at the foundations of alldomains of knowledge, every profession is affected by this update. Polanyi isconscious about this situation, and explicitly mentions biology and other natu¬ral sciences, social science, history, mathematics, art and engineering, too.
The phrase "post-critical” in the subtitle summarizes the main statement verywell. That is: while the critical, objectivist approach - Polanyi uses these termsbroadly to portray all approaches that attempt to remove the personal coefficientfrom knowing - in epistemology has been a tremendously useful for humanity, it
1This article was supported by the lanos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the HungarianAcademy of Sciences and the UNKP-18-4 New National excellence Program of theMinistry of Human Capacities.
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only succeeded because it has never been exercised in a perfectly systematic
manner, leaving room for uncritical elements in the production of knowledge.
Since these uncritical elements are there by necessity, the efforts to remove
them are bound to fail and sometimes produce negative side effects.
These
include making scientists mislead themselves and everybody else
about the
origin and status of their knowledge through moves that Polanyi calls decep¬
tive substitutions; also in a broader social setting, the same systematic,
maxi¬
mally critical attitude inhibits the reflection on human passions
that, of
course, remain just as vigorous regardless of our awareness of them, leading
to moral inversion. This in turn, in Polanyi’s evaluation, is a
contributing fac¬
tor to the horrors of historical catastrophes, like those in the twentieth
centu¬
ry in the two world wars and communism. To heal these very destructive
forces and events, Poldnyi offers the fiduciary program.
6.2 Ontology in Personal Knowledge
Polanyi’s conceptual system in PK, as he himself admits it, is circular on the
explicit level. In order to justify this situation, he explains that on a
conceptual
level, only circular systems of beliefs are possible - no one has any other kind
of conceptual system.
In this case, Polanyi suggests, those systems that reflect on their
own circu¬
larity are more valuable for their honesty than those that pretend
to have
independent foundations but in reality are just as circular.
In Polanyi’s account, animals have evolved to have an usually reliable
grasp
of reality as the opposite was not good for survival. Humanity, at
the most
advanced end of the spectrum of animals, therefore is usually right
to rely on
its skills in knowing reality [120].
It is evident that other animals don’t use language and therefore
their
knowledge can be nothing else but tacit [81]. Human knowledge is also rooted
in
the tacit and can only ever be partially explicit. The consequence of these
state¬
ments is that it is possible for humans to learn the truth about reality,
but what
they learn is always reliant on tacit knowledge and thus cannot pass
wholly
explicit tests or verification, and therefore relying on such tests as anything
more
than heuristic tools in knowledge production is an error in methodology.
These
tests of objectivity and experimental verification can never become such final
arbiters of knowledge as they are sometimes expected to be.
Now, Polanyi’s ontology is proposed in this modality. The following set of
ontological statements is based on several scientists’ work as well as Polanyi’s
own understanding of theworld - but the fact that this is a good description of
the world is on an explicit level only supported by the fact that this is
how
humans tend to understand it.
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In nature, there are ordering principles in effect. These govern all non-random
phenomena, which sometimes are labelled as systems by Polanyi. “When I say
that an event is governed by chance, I deny that it is governed by order” (PK, p34).
An example of a natural phenomenon governed by ordering principles is the
“movement of planets around the sun (PK p39)” Ordering principles have a
subset called operational principles. These describe the“correct functioning’
(PKp346) of entities that have a“teleological charade f (PKp381).
The main statement about these entities is that they are of a class of things
defined by a common operational principle and unspecifiable by the laws of
physics and chemistry. (PICp346)
These entities include machines and living beings that are “classed with
machines” [174]. Therefore these entities are the subject of engineering and
biology, respectively. These disciplines investigate the operational principles
in order to explain successful functioning and fall back to physics and chemis¬
try to explain failures. He says the operational principles of machines are,
therefore “rules of rightness”. (PKp346)
Where entities governed by plain ordering principles end and where entities
governed by operational principles begin (see in the figure below) is never
fully specified by Polanyi. But it is possible to find an example of the simplest
machines, which is the gas flame:
“0 its identity is not defined by its physical or chemical topography, but by the
operational principles which sustain h.”(PKp406)
Other examples offered are cybernetics, typewriters, clocks, boats, telephones,
locomotives, cameras (PKp345)
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6.3 Dual Control
These entities emerge from the physico-chemical level of existence to a high¬
er level (see the explanation below at the “intensity of coherent existence”).
The resulting situation is what Polanyi calls dual control in his 1965 essay
Structure of Consciousness [169], In order for the system to function properly,
by its operational principles, the physical-chemical environment, as well as
the parts of the system, needs to be within certain physico-chemical limits.
These conditions enable the governance of the operational principles and
therefore the explanation of the success of the entity requires these princi¬
ples. The situation is explained in detail by [139],
However, failure is to be explained by physics and chemistry, and as a devia¬
tion from the necessary conditions or obstacles that prevent the successful
work of operational principles.
Therefore, there are two different kinds of conditions operating on different
levels. Both sets are necessary for the machine-like entity’s proper functioning
Hence, the situation is controlled by both, as the term dual control suggests.
6.4 Operational Principles and Life
In case of living beings, the operational principles in question are researched
by biology, but the dual control situation is the same: “[a] machine-like func¬
tion is characterized by its operational principle, Therefore, as an organism
sustains itself by functioning as a machine, it is the embodiment of an ordering
principle that cannot be defined in terms of physics and chemistry.’’ (PKp426)
Moreover, there is an explicit link between technology and life, as “every
manifestation of life is a technical achievement, and is therefore - like the prac¬
tice of technology - an applied knowledge of nature." (PKp426)
The examples for operational principles of life are equilibration (PKp359)
during embryonic development, organ development, metabolism but also the
more advanced forms of self-regulation like identifying food or prey and
thriving to reproduce.
6.5 From Ontology to Epistemology
As we progress from randomness through ordering principles to operational
principles, we see higher and higher“intensity of coherent existence” (PKp39).
Living things, especially animals themselves are examples of more coher¬
ently existing entities and, at the same time, their survival usually depends on
recognizing other such entities. Moreover, in order to survive, they need to
learn about how such entities behave, either as prey, dangerous predators, or
tools. For animals, this knowledge is entirely tacit. Humans are able to express
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and transmit their knowledge, but only partially. Yet, as Polanyi explains, this
ability gave the gift of cultural inheritance.
Part of this inheritance is the sciences. The structure of knowledge of sci¬
ences reflects their subject [139], Therefore engineering and biology contain
teleological elements and the study of operational principles. Attempts to
transform these disciplines (Polanyi discusses biology, but we can infer to
engineering science as well), to be more like physics and chemistry - especial¬
ly by removing the teleological element - have been damaging and if done
systematically it results in a loss of grip on reality.
And just as the teleological element cannot be sensibly removed from these
disciplines, the so-called intellectual passions should be preserved too. These
again are rooted in animal passions like the drive by hunger, self-preservation
and reproduction. As with knowledge, Polanyi sees continuity between animals
and humans and human scientists in this respect, too.The scientists possess the
selective passion, which helps to tell apart the interesting phenomena, theories
and directions from the non-interesting ones and is a remote descendant of the
selective mechanisms of animals, e.g., during hunting or searching for food.
There is a kind of passion that facilitates problem-solving in both engineering
and science and can be traced back to the heuristic capabilities that can be
shown in animal experiments.These experiments reveal what Polanyi calls Type
A learning, which involves a heuristic act of contrivance. For animals, this is
essential for discovering means-ends-relationships.
For human engineers, the situation is not at all different. They harbor a par¬
ticular kind of intellectual passion, the heuristic passion for discovering novel
and economic ways for achieving goals.
Finally, there is the persuasive passion that drives the scientist to try and
share his or her knowledge and convince others about the discovered truth,
which is again traced back to the feeling of the comfort of conviviality already
present in the animal kingdom.
6.6 Engineering epistemology
Based on the previous discussion, engineering is a form of contrivance. The
subject of this contrivance is finding operational principles and explaining
failures, often with physics and chemistry. Its subjects are dual-controlled.
machines. Engineering can be mostly associated with the heuristic passion
but also draws on all intellectual passions.
Naturally, like all domains of knowledge, engineering heavily on tacit
knowledge. Because of the nature of operational principles, it is necessarily
teleological. This teleological nature is also the reason why it is often identified
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as normative, if the goal is to create a machine, the operational principles be¬
come prescriptions for what to do, for how to achieve the proper functioning.
Also, we can establish that engineering is not just Applied Science (where
“science” means physics, chemistry - as is often implied in English but less so
in other languages). True, natural science is a necessary part of engineering
used in explaining failures and investigating the physico-chemical precondi¬
tions of operational principles. But a major part of engineering is about these
principles themselves about which physics and chemistry cannot say any¬
thing. This enables the viability of basic engineering research, which concerns
operational principles.
6.7 Summary
Polanyi does not aim to say novel things about the philosophy of engineering
in particular. He intends to reform all domains of knowledge, including engi¬
neering about which he consciously formulates some key statements. Both
epistemic and ontological elements are provided for understanding the field.
The fact that there are different intensities of existence in Polanyi’s account
means that this is a multi-layered ontology, but one which is emergent on mat¬
ter. This provides us with the concept of the dual-controlled emergent machine
that is both based on matter and governed by operational principles. This is the
subject of engineering and its characteristics should be reflected in the nature of
engineering knowledge - containing teleological knowledge and material laws.
Just like any field of human knowledge, engineering relies on intellectual
passions, mostly the heuristic passion which drives problem-solving, a focal
activity of engineering.
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concept which is seldom present in real life situations for epistemic agents.
Therefore, calculating with certain evidence appeal's to be hardly applicable
which limits the applicability of classic conditionalization. Replacing classic
conditionalization with Jeffrey conditionalization allows the system to work
with uncertain evidence in accordance with Kolmogorov’s axioms. While
there are further interesting questions concerning Bayesian probability, such
as how to determine prior probability, or how to evaluate the values provided
by functions that are based on Bayesian probability theory, these questions
are independent from the questions of the certainty of evidence. The above
paper only aimed to show that the interpretation of Bayesian probability
theory currently applied in a great number of decision support systems is
seriously limited. The offered alternative, using Jeffrey conditionalization
significantly extends the applicability of the reasoning structure of decision
support systems if Bayesian probability theories are at all applicable. For
example, for cases where the evidence used by such systems is not entirely
certain, the level of certainty attributed to the used evidence can be accom¬
modated to the probability calculations used by the reasoning structure of the
system. Without Jeffrey conditionalization this information is lost during such
calculations, which causes the system to estimate the probability of an event
to be higher or lower than it really is (i.e. it should be estimated according to
our present knowledge concerning probability). Since the applicability of
Bayesian probability theory is the subject of intense debates, this paper can¬
not aim for the general assessment of the framework but only for the im¬
provement of its application in decision support systems.
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